Abstract-In this paper, we consider a smart grid incorporating numerous devices. In order to manage the energy distribution, we propose an algorithm that employs the group bargaining concept of game theory to efficiently allocate electricity resources among these devices. First, we divide the devices into non-overlapping groups, and allow devices to bargain both within and across groups. Second, we regard each group as homogeneous, so that the bargaining authority can be delegated to a representative device. Thus, the bargaining problem involves only the representatives, each of which bargains with other representatives on behalf of the group it belongs to. Third, we compare various bargaining results via a utility function that indicates the satisfaction level of a representative in terms of the bargaining result. Finally, the algorithm determines the optimal resource distribution pattern by maximizing the aggregated utilities of all representatives. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can reduce the complexity of energy distribution by distinguishing between inter-and intra-group bargaining processes, and can efficiently allocate resources to various devices according to their actual requirements.
INTRODUCTION
Electric power systems around the world are being upgraded with a combination of communication, automation, and metering infrastructures, commonly known as a smart grid [1] . Smart grid technology enables demand-side response systems to operate with pinpoint accuracy. At the heart of the smart grid concept is active customer participation to help reduce costs, and at the same time increase the efficiency of the system. Also, real-time pricing information is available to customers to help them reduce or shift the load during peak hours. Smart buildings are practical enablers of the smart grid concept.
Thus far, most existing studies have utilized time scheduling to shift loads to off-peak hours [2] . In our previous work, we developed a system in which different kinds of devices bargain with each other, assigning devices to three main classes based on their priorities and requirements [3] . Non-shiftable devices require an uninterrupted power supply while operating, regardless of energy cost. Examples of nonshiftable loads include office PCs and building alarm systems. Controllable devices, such as lighting and HVAC units, can increase or decrease their demand according to energy costs, by dimming, thermostatic control, and/or fan-speed variation. On the other hand, shiftable loads can schedule their operations during off-peak hours, when energy costs are lower, so that not only are peaks avoided, but also monthly bills are reduced. Examples of shiftable loads include energy storage systems, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and water heaters.
Some recent research provides new insight into the resource allocation problem, which employs the idea of Nash bargaining from game theoretic methods. [4] surveyed the papers for game theoretic approach for smart grid. The original bargaining model only considers two players, however, a smart grid system usually comprises a wide variety of devices, and it is difficult to include all of them in the resource bargaining process. In the economic domain, different parties sometimes have to share public facilities, and some of the parties may be groups of individuals, such as labor unions, companies, or entire countries. In some of the existing studies, groups have been treated as single agents, and a theoretical foundation has been laid for the practice of treating groups of individuals as single bargainers. In particular, [5] introduced a bargaining model in which groups of individuals bargain with each other. Based on this model, a Nash bargaining solution was obtained across groups, with the aim of increasing group benefits by forming a union. In the present paper, we adopt this basic group bargaining idea to develop an algorithm for efficiently distributing electricity resources among devices in a smart grid. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and the formulation of the group bargaining game. Simulation results are presented in Section III. Conclusions and future research plans are summarized in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. A group Bargaining Game based on Representatives
We adopt the group bargaining concept to efficiently distribute electricity resources among the various devices in a smart grid. We assume that these devices "actively" bargain with each other for electricity resources. Since there are always a great many devices in a facility (including building, home and industry), it is not realistic to regard each device as a single entity and include it in the bargaining process. Here, we introduce a group bargaining model, in which devices are divided into non-overlapping groups. In each group, the bargaining authority is delegated to a special device called the representative, which bargains with other representatives on behalf of the group it belongs to. The final bargaining result is obtained by solving a maximization problem, which provides the optimal resource distribution. We describe the formulation of the group bargaining game in 1) to 3).
1) Characterize group preferences
In order to model a group as a single bargaining entity, we must specify its preferences. In real life, bargaining authority is usually delegated to a designated group member called the representative, whose preferences become the group's preferences. The representative then bargains with other representatives on behalf of his own group. In this study, we adopt this idea and select one device as the representative for each group.
2) Homogeneous property
We assume that the bargaining problem is symmetric for all devices in the same group. In other words, all devices in a group have identical bargaining characteristics, and we say that such a group is homogeneous [5] . Combining this property with 1), it is assumed that once bargaining authority has been delegated to a representative, during the subsequent bargaining process, all devices in the group will receive the same resource proportion as the representative. A detailed explanation will be given in subsection C.
3) Formulation of the group bargaining game
Consider a smart grid system represented by a set E containing n devices, and let E={{1},…,{n}}. In accordance with conventional game theory, we regard each "device" as a "player" in what follows. A utility vector is used to represent the n players' utilities, and such a vector is regarded as an element of the n-dimensional Euclidean utility space E R , which is indexed by the n players.
By applying some grouping technique based on the theory of coalition formation [6] , we can divide E into k nonoverlapping groups, represented by a partition
In this paper, we will not specify how the players are to be grouped, since this is a complex problem in itself, and will be investigated in our future work. Here we simply assume that the players are divided into groups with a group structure G, and its feasible utility set F is a subset of E R . Then the bargaining problem can be represented as a tuple (G, F), consisting of a group structure and a feasible utility set. . Then x is regarded as an agreement for the bargaining game. Here, the agreement concept is derived from cooperative game theory, where players try to collaborate to reach an agreement on how to share public goods, and if the negotiation process fails, disagreement is the result [7] . In our case, the players will share common resources, and a resource division is regarded as an agreement containing a set of resources. will be given in subsection B.
Unlike the existing bargaining model [5] , here we exclude the concept of a disagreement point. As in our case, we always enforce the baseline that non-shiftable players receive the required resources, and controllable players receive at least the minimum required resources, regardless of peak hours. Obviously, this baseline is also an acceptable result in our model.
A solution of the proposed group bargaining game can be obtained by solving the maximization problem [8] :
the solution being the optimal agreement that maximizes the sum of the utilities of the group representatives..
B. Defining the Utility Function
In order to model the responses of different representatives to real-time electricity prices, we adopt the utility function concept from microeconomics [3] . Until now, how to define a suitable utility function for demand-response applications has remained an open question [9] . In this research, we assume that each representative will try to adjust its bargaining resource to maximize its satisfaction level, so that an optimal agreement x can be reached by maximizing (1) . We employ the following quadratic utility function to characterize the satisfaction level of a representative during the bargaining process:
N is the number of players in group j. j P is the priority of group j, there are k groups altogether, and we assume that the sum of all the group priorities is constrained to equal one (
is the real-time electricity price received from the utility company [10] . and are parameters defined by the user, determined by specific demands or different times of day, and also help to quantify the utility value.
The utility function given by (2) can indicate the satisfaction level of any representative in terms of the agreement x. Moreover, this utility function is concave, and thus as long as the feasible agreements are finite, we can obtain the optimal result by using (1) to check all agreements. The process will be discussed in detail in subsection C. The physical meaning of (2) will be discussed in Section III.
C. Group Bargaining Algorithm
Group bargaining can be regarded as happening on two levels: inter-group bargaining and intra-group bargaining [7] . The former occurs between groups, while the latter occurs between the players inside a group. In this paper, we discuss these two bargaining processes separately.
We assume that the system is equipped with an energy service interface (ESI), which serves as the contact point between the utility company and the customer side [11] . The algorithm is to be installed at the ESI, which employs a centralized method of managing the energy distribution for the whole system.
1) Input to the Algorithm
Unit price data: The hourly unit price data are received from the utility company through the ESI. An example of a utility that currently provides this type of service is Ameren Illinois Power [10] .
Available budget: The system designer specifies an hourly budget, which facilitates the computation of the total available resources for distribution.
Group priority: The priority of each group depends upon the group's characteristics and importance. The sum of all the group priorities should be constrained to equal one.
Device information: The device information includes the class of the device and its required amount of energy during a specific hour. For a non-shiftable device, the required energy could be a fixed value. On the other hand, the required energy for a controllable device can be specified as a range of values, varying from a minimum to a maximum. A shiftable device also has a required energy, which cannot be guaranteed when the energy cost is high. We assume that this required energy can also be specified by a range of values, varying from zero to a nominal resource amount.
2) Output of the Algorithm
The output of the proposed algorithm is the agreement that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all group representatives, and indicates the optimal resource distribution pattern.
3) Main Steps
Although player requirements might actually vary from one hour to the next, here we assume that the requirements of each player are the same for each of the 24 hours. Thus, we describe our algorithm on an hourly basis, but not for any specific hour. In the simulation, we will demonstrate a 24-hour resource distribution pattern. The main steps of the proposed algorithm are described below, and a flow chart that summarizes each step is shown in Fig. 1 .
Step 1: Receive the hourly price and calculate the available resources
The algorithm starts by receiving the electricity price from the utility company, together with the pre-specified hourly budget, and calculates the available resource ava S via the equation
Step 2: Divide the devices into groups As mentioned in subsection A, we are not yet specifying how the players are to be grouped. Here we simply divide players into groups according to device class (non-shiftable, controllable, or shiftable) and the number of players in each class.
Step 3: Select a representative from each group Since all groups are homogeneous, any player in a group can act as the representative to bargain with other representatives.
Step 4: Check all possible agreements x based on step size (inter-group bargaining)
Since non-shiftable players have strict resource requirements, they must be satisfied before we consider the other two classes of players, and are excluded from the bargaining process. Thus, only controllable and shiftable representatives will bargain with each other. Note that the required resource can vary from a minimum to a maximum value for a controllable player, and from zero to a nominal resource for a shiftable player. As a result, each agreement x is a vector composed of different reserved resources for controllable and shiftable representatives.
During the bargaining process, each representative tries to increase its reserved resource (from the minimum to the maximum required resource, or from zero to the nominal resource) based on the step size . There will be different combinations of values corresponding to different agreements. For each agreement x, we calculate the sum of the utilities, as specified in (1), and record the value. If the new sum is greater than the previously recorded sum, the algorithm will go to step 5; otherwise, it will go back to step 4 and check other agreements. 
Step 5: Calculate the reserved resources for nonrepresentatives from the representative's proportion (intragroup bargaining)
In this research, the homogeneous property is taken to mean that non-representative players in a group have the same resource proportion as the representative. Take any controllable representative 
Thus, the reserved resources can be calculated for all nonrepresentatives. This simple procedure is regarded as the intragroup bargaining process in the present research.
Step 6: Calculate the reserved resource total tot S For any agreement x, after calculating the reserved resources for all non-representative players, we check whether or not the reserved resource total tot S is within the available resource limit. tot S can be calculated from
Note that if tot S exceeds ava S , we should discard agreement x; otherwise, we temporarily record agreement x as the best agreement and go back to step 4 to check other agreements.
There is a special case in which the available resources fail to guarantee that non-shiftable devices will receive the required resources, and controllable devices will receive the minimum required resources. Under these circumstances, we will increase the budget and go back to step 1 to restart the algorithm [4] .
Step 7: Determine the final optimal agreement x Since each representative has a limited required resource range, and the resource reservation process of step 4 is based on a step size, so that the total number of possible agreements is finite, and we can ultimately arrive at a solution to the proposed bargaining game. This solution will be the optimal agreement obtained by maximizing the sum of the utilities of the group representatives based on (1).
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III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results and assess the performance of our proposed group bargaining algorithm. We first describe the simulation scenario, then explain the key steps, and finally discuss the results of the simulation.
A. Scenario
We chose Matlab as the simulation tool and chose twentysix devices commonly associated with facility (home, building or industry) including all three device classes (non-shiftable, controllable, and shiftable). Only two non-shiftable devices were chosen, since they are not involved in the bargaining process. We selected fourteen controllable devices and divided them into four groups, two with four devices each, and the other two with three devices each. Similarly, twelve shiftable devices were chosen for the simulation, and divided into four groups of three devices each. To facilitate understanding, each device was assigned the same required resource for each of the 24 hours, although it may actually vary from hour to hour. Table I provides information on the eight groups of controllable and shiftable devices. Because of the homogeneous property, each device had the same bargaining ability within the group, and we simply selected the first device in each group as the representative. The representatives are indicated by boldface type in Table I , and the remaining entries are non-representative devices.
The pricing data was provided by the Ameren Illinois Power Company [10] . As Fig. 2 indicates, low prices, high prices, and peak prices for different hours were included.
B. Simulation Steps
Step 1 to 3: We assumed an average hourly budget of $0.15. After receiving the unit price data from the utility company, we calculated the available resources for each hour. Since we are not yet specifying how devices are to be grouped, here we simply grouped the devices as listed in Table I .
Step 4: In this step, we began to compare different agreements by calculating the sum of the utilities. As described above, each agreement is composed of a sequence of resources reserved by the representatives. Before comparing the agreements, we first calculated step size using (4). From Table I , the representative Cj*_4 of the fourth controllable group was selected, and was then calculated as 10 2 / 8 / ) 80 120 ( , based on the gap between the minimum and maximum required resources of Cj*_4.
Step 5: In this step, if some agreement x resulted in a greater sum of utilities, we calculated the reserved resources for the non-representatives. Take the second controllable group as an example. At 5 p.m., device 7 received a resource of 105 watts, and the three non-representative devices received 108.3, . Fig. 3 shows the intra-group resource distribution for the second controllable group.
Step 6: In this step, we checked whether or not the reserved resource total, calculated from the agreement of step 5, exceeded the available resource limit. Take 9 a.m. as an example. For one agreement, the reserved resource total was 284.33 watts, which surpassed the available resource limit of 284.04 watts. Thus, this agreement should have been discarded.
Step 7: In this step, we determined the final optimal agreement from among all the possible agreements for each hour based on (1). The resource distribution results for 24 hours are shown in Fig. 4 for one non-shiftable device, the four controllable representatives (Cj*_1 to Cj*_4), and the four shiftable representatives (Sj*_1 to Sj*_4).
C. Discussion of the Results
Using the proposed group bargaining algorithm, we efficiently distributed the available resources within and across groups. As Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 indicate, the resource distribution generally operated inversely to the price-changing process, and properly avoided peak-hour consumption. Fig. 4 , the representative's reserved resource always decreased later in a higher priority group than in a lower priority group. In real life, people usually prefer to satisfy higher priority devices first, since they tend to play more significant roles in daily lives. This is reflected in (2) . Since the utility function is concave and the price is fixed for a specific hour, it is easy to conclude that the more resource a higher priority (greater value) representative reserves, the greater its utility will be. And as we are aiming to maximize the sum utility based on (1), hence, the utility function can guarantee that higher priority representatives (or groups) will acquire more resources than lower priority ones during the bargaining process.
According to
During peak hours (2 p.m. and 3 p.m.), Cj*_1 and Cj*_2 were not reduced to the minimum required resources (as Cj*_3 and Cj*_4 were). Associating with real life, we assume that controllable devices such as air conditioners might not be adjusted to the minimum level during summer. To some degree, the results shown in Fig. 4 closely correspond to real life, and other devices of this type could be assigned to the same group.
At 5 p.m., there was a fluctuation: the resources of Cj*_2 and Cj*_3 decreased a little, while the first shiftable representative began to receive some amount of resource. Due to the proportional intra-group distribution, other devices in this group also received some resources. In daily life, 5 p.m. is usually the beginning of off-duty time, and devices such as PHEVs could be assigned to this group to facilitate people's lives.
Last but not least, through the proposed inter-and intragroup bargaining scheme, our algorithm reduced the complexity of distributing resources to devices by adopting group bargaining idea, and provided some insights into the energy management problem.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a group bargaining algorithm to efficiently distribute electricity resources among numerous devices in a smart grid. In the group bargaining model, devices are divided into non-overlapping groups. Because of the homogeneous property, the bargaining authority for each group is delegated to a special device called the representative, which bargains with other representatives on behalf of the group to which it belongs. From among all the possible agreements under given conditions, the optimal resource distribution is obtained by maximizing the sum of the utilities of the representatives. The ideas developed in this paper can be extended in several directions. A sophisticated exploration scheme must be developed to reduce the computational burden. The inter-group bargaining concept could be applied to the intra-group resource distribution process, where each group might be regarded as heterogeneous; for example, each group might contain devices with different priorities. More parameters might be included in the utility function to reveal a variety of daily requirements, such as fairness, cost, discomfort level, and so on. Also, energy storage system could be included to help reducing peak hours based on its flexible operation.
